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The most practical outcome of such inability to agree in 1899 was a formal acknowledgment that matters remained unresolved but that there was a will to continue to work toward their resolution. Thus, in the Final Act the 1899 Conference provided for a second meeting to deal with matters left unresolved at the first. Eight years later the 1907 Conference was convened 'for the purpose of giving a fresh development to the humanitarian principles which served as a basis for the work of the First Conference of 1907 Conference called for the parties to come together again. The plan was never realized, instead falling casualty to the same forces that led eventually to World War I.
5 The ability to express disagreement alongside the desire for eventual accord reached a new level of articulation at the 1899 and 1907 Conferences. This laid the groundwork for the increasing influence of voluntary statements, → consensus, → non-binding agreements, → soft law, and other innovative outcomes of international negotiations over the next century. The powers' ability in 1899 to agree on a convention for the → peaceful settlement of international disputes, but inability to agree on how to handle compulsory → arbitration, reflects the tension between striving for accord on the one hand and expressing uncertainty as to how such agreement would affect State → sovereignty, independence, and national strength on the other. In many ways the Conferences provide vivid glimpses into States' evolving efforts to figure out how to act and interact on a changing international stage.
6 The 1899 Conference, as an entity whose identity was to become distinct from the States attending it, endowed itself with the ability to express an opinion separate from that of the assembled States by the sheer act of simply doing so. Reporting on the 1899 Conference, Scott described unsigned (as opposed to signed) declarations, resolutions, and voeux as new forms of agreement into which international sentiment could be poured and shaped, being understood as merely the 'expression of an opinion', more or less formal, by the Conference (Scott 8) . To make clear the non-binding nature of the unsigned resolutions, declarations, and voeux, the participating countries neither signed nor were named in any of them. They were considered 'complete in themselves, requiring no action on the part of Governments to perfect them' (ibid). With this understanding, the Conferences not only asserted a life of their own but allowed States to participate without committing themselves to concrete action before (legal) personality was ever ascribed to any entities other than States.
7 Although the 1899 Conference issued no unsigned declarations, which had equal effect to conventions, its resolutions and voeux were unsigned. This early departure from allowing States only the simple choice of committing or not to binding obligations paved the way for international conferences to move from decision by unanimity or majority voting toward the consensus decision-making that grew to dominate international conferences over the course of the 20 century. Scott observed of the 1899 Resolution quoted above that it 'was the action of the Conference, not of the nations represented in it, and that they were willing by their silence to allow the Conference to adopt such a resolution, provided it were understood to be the opinion of the Conference and not the binding expression of opinion controlling the actions of their respective governments' (ibid 10; emphasis added).
B. Context: Transitions in Government, Nationhood, and Sovereignty
8 The expansion of different forms of government around the turn of the century that the two Conferences straddled assured almost by necessity that the assembled powers would have to invent new diplomatic forms to express both collective opinion and lack of agreement. Representative forms of government were on the increase and individual delegations attending the two Conferences were under varying degrees of obligation to seek from parliaments or other representative bodies back home the acts agreed to at the Conferences. The existence of the non-binding Final Act of the 1899 Conference-a kind of umbrella document summarizing the matters agreed to and left unresolved-arose out of the 'protocol problem' that not all of the representatives in attendance had full powers to bind their State. If the conventions and unsigned voeux had been the only outcomes, some th delegations would have had nothing to sign (Rosenne xxiv-xxv). The instrument of the final act, in similar but more concise form, is still used by diplomatic conferences today (ibid). December 1898 laid out a proposed list of subjects to be addressed at the Conference, the first four dealing with qualitative and quantitative arms control (covered at the Conference by the First Commission), three relating to codifying the laws of neutrality and of → naval warfare and → land warfare (these became the domain of the Second Commission), and one relating to the pacific settlement of international disputes (taken up by the Third Commission).
C. Actors and Influences at the 1899 Conference

D. The Structure and Outcomes of the 1899 Conference
12 The outcomes of the 1899 Conference-three conventions, three declarations, and six voeux-reflect its working structure as well as the subjects proposed by the Russian Note of December 1898. The First Commission, chaired by Auguste Beernaerts of Belgium, was unable to agree on any convention for the reduction or prohibition of armaments, producing instead three declarations. The Second and Third Commissions, dealing respectively with land warfare and pacific means of settling disputes, produced the Conferences' three conventions. Finally, the six voeux corresponded to issues on which the parties were unable to reach accord in the Commissions. The Second Commission, under the chairmanship of Russia's FF de Martens, summarized and organized over 50 years of debate on the rules of war into two conventions laying out clearly the agreed-upon rules and customs of warfare: the Convention II (1899) (including in its preamble the → Martens Clause and in its annexes the Hague Regulations) and Convention III (1899). The Third Commission produced Convention I (1899) under the chairmanship of Léon Bourgeois of France.
13 The Final Act of the 1899 Conference identified these three conventions and the three declarations as texts on which 'the Conference has agreed, for submission for signature by the plenipotentiaries' (Scott [1915] 25). All parties in attendance signed each of the three treaties, with the exception of Convention II (1899) respecting land warfare, which China and Switzerland declined to sign. The three declarations all dealt with arms prohibitions and were intended, respectively, a) To prohibit the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other similar new methods.
b) To prohibit the use of projectiles, the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.
c) To prohibit the use of [Dum-dum] bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.
14 As to the non-binding wishes, the first of the six voeux was the most aggressive, calling for steps to be 'shortly taken' (Final Act of the 1899 Conference) to assemble a special conference to revise the Geneva Conventions. Voeu 1 was also the only one to pass unanimously without abstention. The operative wording of voeu 2, requesting that the rights and duties of neutrals 'be inserted in the program of a Conference in the near future', differed subtly from the call of voeux 5 and 6 that two questions of naval warfareinviolability of private property, and naval bombardments of ports, towns, and villages-be 'referred to a subsequent Conference'. The language of voeux 3 and 4 seems the least committal of all, calling on governments to have 'studied' and to 'examine' the use of certain calibres and types of rifles and naval guns (3), and possible limits on armed forces and war budgets (4). This reluctance to demand more of the assembled powers with regard to limiting military budgets proved prescient. As Vagts observes (at 37), even after World War I States continued to be unable to agree on such limitations, a → League of Nations Conference on General Disarmament having borne no fruit in its attempts to 'constrain national defense budgets' and reconfirm the → Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) 
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In keeping with traditional diplomatic practice, a plenipotentiary issued the invitation to the 1907 Conference. However, the forces leading up to the convening of the meeting reflected the growing influence of actors other than individual States. Two organizations, inter-and non-governmental, helped to bring about and shape the 1907 Conference. As seen, the first Conference made explicit provision for a second meeting to be called. Building on that promise, in 1903 the American Peace Society-a non-governmental group whose stated purpose was to 'promote permanent international peace through justice; and to advance in every proper way the general use of conciliation, arbitration, judicial methods, and other peaceful means of avoiding and adjusting differences among nations'-sponsored an initiative to convene the second Conference, to which US President Roosevelt responded favourably. A year later, the → Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) passed a similar resolution at its 1904 meeting, lending more weight to the call. The IPU was founded in 1889 as an international organization of Parliaments of sovereign nations with the object of promoting peace and harmony among governments, as well as 'engendering a love of peace' amongst the people of the world.
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With 43 delegations taking part in the 1907 Conference, the number of States attending was almost double that in 1899, although the number of sovereign States had not changed dramatically in the eight years separating the two conferences. The 1907 Conference only partially improved representation of the world's various regions, Africa again remaining unrepresented and thus reflecting the grip of the colonial powers on the African continent. All of the Latin American States received invitations and 19 attended: Honduras and Costa Rica responded to the invitation by appointing delegates and reserved seats, but neither country took the seats. Asia was represented by China, Japan, Persia, and Siam.
G. Structures and Outcomes of the 1907 Conference
23 The 1907 Conference continued the form and practice of the Final Act, introduced in 1899, to summarize and highlight what the States, assembled as the Conference, had accomplished. The Conference as such was an entity independent of the States for the time they were convened but did not continue its existence past 1907. This time there was but one declaration, and it was unsigned; four voeux instead of six, and a grand total of 13 binding conventions, more than quadrupling the number agreed to in 1899.
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The Final Act of the 1907 Conference appended 13 separate conventions, all of which were open for signature and ratification by all States in attendance. Regardless of invitation or attendance, States not at the 1907 Conference could accede to all but one of the 13. This practice contrasts with that applied to the three conventions produced by the 1899 Conference, whereby the conventions regarding the laws and customs of land warfare, and on maritime warfare, had required conference attendance in order to join the treaty. Accession to the other 1899 Convention, on peaceful settlement of disputes, was open to all States, regardless of whether they had attended the 1899 Conference. In 1907, it was only for accession to the Convention I on arbitration that a State had to have been invited to the Conference.
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Ten of the 13 1907 conventions were new; the other three revised the three conventions agreed to in 1899. Of these three revised treaties, the Convention II (1899) Modifications and additions included regulating neutral countries' treatment of interned and wounded belligerents and allowing neutral countries to leave at liberty escaped prisoners of war and those prisoners brought into a neutral country.
27 Among the 10 new Conventions of 1907 was the Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities. Of the nine remaining treaties, six related to naval operations, the sheer number and narrow focus of each not only reflecting that the law of naval warfare, then as now, relies primarily on customary international law (see Roach) but also possibly foreshadowing the circumstance that naval warfare still lacks a comprehensive governing treaty. One of these seven naval treaties was the Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court, which envisaged a Prize Court to deal with the capture of neutral ships. Such a court never materialized, contemporary commentators rightly predicting that significantly different national laws, the inherent unwillingness of a capturing country to subordinate its courts' judgments regarding captured vessels, and potential constitutional conflicts would make the proposed Prize Court unattainable. Another naval treaty was the Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, which codified some of the law of neutrality at sea (the parallel Convention V [1907] did the same for neutrality on land). This progress in the law of neutrality is one of the greatest successes of the 1907 Conference, exemplified in such provisions as Art. 7 in both neutrality conventions whereby neutral powers are considered to have no obligation to prohibit the export of weapons to belligerents.
28 States continued to be incapable of agreement on the issue of obligatory arbitration, the resolution of which had proved so elusive at the 1899 Conference, as had the ability to express a common understanding of what the concept meant. The three different approaches put forth in 1899 were revisited: a) providing for obligatory arbitration on a bilateral treaty basis only; b) requiring obligatory arbitration in a universal treaty but allowing exceptions for matters inconsistent with national honour and vital interests; or c) concluding a universal treaty that listed only specific matters subject to obligatory arbitration. The continuing difficulty of this issue for the parties can be attributed at least in part to the simple fact that the idea was still emerging as a new concept, and one that had great potential to infringe on traditional notions of State sovereignty. Adopting the format introduced in 1899, when the First Hague Conference-as its own entity-memorialized in a nonbinding agreement the things upon which the States themselves could not agree (then it was arms limitations and prohibitions), the 1907 Conference issued a nonbinding declaration that the parties were unanimous in 'admitting the principle of compulsory obligation' (Scott 27) . The term itself remained undefined. The declaration also stated that the 'certain disputes, in particular those relating to the interpretation and application of the provisions of international agreements, may be submitted to compulsory arbitration without any restriction'. The declaration result built, however tentatively, on the shifting foundation laid by Art. 19 Convention I (1899), which had reserved to the parties the 'right of concluding, either before the ratification of the present Act or later, new Agreements, general or private, with a view to extending obligatory arbitration to all cases which they may consider it possible to submit to it'. The first voeu of 1907 (included in the Final Act of the 1907 Conference) also took up the topic, calling on the parties to adopt an annexed draft convention for the creation of a judicial arbitration court.
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In 1907 the proposal for such a court ended up in an annexed draft rather than a convention for signature in part due to the concerns of the smaller powers that their interests would not be adequately represented. The draft annexed to the first voeu had no provision for judges because the smaller powers rejected the model of permanent seats for great powers and rotating seats for lesser powers. The solution rejected in 1907 has since appeared in other settings, no less recently than the final structure of the United Nations Security Council, which is itself the subject of on-going proposals for reform. The Hague Conferences were, as stated at the outset, unlike any other before them; the inclusion of States other than the great European powers was yet another innovation that shaped the form of international consensus building and diplomacy into the current century.
30 Another legacy of the two conferences was their forging of procedural means to allow all participants, regardless of size or actual political or military power, to participate in a formal if not always a substantive way in the process of international negotiation. A related legacy is also procedural: that of devising a means for the Conference to express itself as an entity independent of the States attending it. These procedural innovations proved to have substantive effects as well, in the end allowing the States to make gradual advances toward the peaceful settlement of disputes, arms limitation, and the laws of war that would be built upon throughout the 20 century. The greatest legacy of the 1899 and 1907 Conferences, however, is the on-going influence of the Hague Regulations, which are still in force more than 100 years after their creation and have continued to shape humanitarian law into the 21 century. 
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